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NOTES
THE PENN CENTRAL REORGANIZATION: A NEW
LOOK AT SECTION 10 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
The Clayton Act supplements the Sherman Act2 by proscribing
specified trade practices3 that encourage the growth of monopolies.4
Section 10 of the Clayton Ace prohibits dealings in securities, sup-
plies, or other articles of commerce between a common carrier and a
corporation with which it shares directors, 6 unless the dealing was
conducted pursuant to competitive bidding. This section has received
1. Ch. 368, 38 Star. 730 (1914) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 29 U.S.C.).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
3. The Act declares illegal four specific types of restrictive or monopolistic practices,
including price discrimination, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), exclusive dealing and tying
contracts, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), acquisitions of competing companies, § 7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1970), and interlocking directorates, §§ 8, 10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 19, 20 (1970).
4. The preamble to the original Clayton bill explained that its purpose was "to pro-
hibit certain trade practices which . . . singly and in themselves are not covered by the
[Sherman Act] ... and thus to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies and monopolies
in their incipiency and before consummation." S. RrX. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1914).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1970). That section provides:
No common carrier engaged in commerce shall have any dealings in
securities, supplies, or other articles of commerce . . . to the amount of
more than $50,000, in the aggregate, in any one year, with another cor-
poration . . . when the said common carrier shall have upon its board of
directors . . . any person who is at the same time a director, manager,
or purchasing or selling officer of, or who has any substantial interest in,
such other corporation... unless and except... such dealings shall be ...
ascertained by competitive bidding under regulations to be prescribed ...
by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Further, the ICC is empowered to refer any matter to the Attorney General if it
believes a violation has occurred. Section 10 also prescribes a fine to be levied against
the carrier and criminal penalties against the directors of the carrier in the event of
violation; it is the only section of the Clayton Act authorizing criminal sanctions di-
rected against a specific anticompetitive practice.
6. Interlocking directorates can be between either competitors in the same industry
(horizontal) or entities in different industries that have a commercial relationship
(vertical). Section 10 generally has been read to apply to vertical interlocks, see Note,
Interlocking Directorates: A Study in Desultory Regulation, 29 INo. LJ. 429 (1954), but
in Klinger v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 432 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 1970), it was applied to i
horizontal interlock. Cf. 1 R. CALLuvw, UNrFAnt CoMPETrox, TADEmAmm AND Mo-
NOPOLIES 5 15.3(d) (4)d., at 416 (1967, Supp. 1975).
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scant attention from commentators7 or courts8 in the 62 years since its
enactment. Consequently, litigation connected with the bankruptcy
of the Penn Central Railroad raises questions concerning Section 10 that
never have been resolved.
In the reorganization proceedings subsequent to bankruptcy,9 Penn
Central Company stock holders ° and court-appointed representatives
of certain secured creditors" filed petitions attacking the validity 2 of
a $300,000,000 credit agreement between Penn Central and First Na-
tional City Bank, which acted for itself and as agent for forty-seven
"lender" banks and five "participant" banks. Each of the participant
banks shared common directors with Penn Central. Additionally, late
7. See, e.g., J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 52-53 (1973 ed.)
('The common-carrier requirements in section 10, although containing criminal sanc-
tions, are of so little interest ... that they will be passed over.")
8. The Supreme Court has decided only three cases involving alleged violations of
section 10, and in none of these did the Court engage in a substantive analysis of the
statute. See Bangor Punta Ops., Inc. v. Bangor & A.R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974); United
States v. Boston & Me. R.R., 380 U.S. 157 (1965); Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United
States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959).
9. On June 21, 1970 the Penn Central Transportation Company filed a petition for
voluntary bankruptcy under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. S 205 (1970),
which permits reorganization of railroads under the supervision of court-appointed
trustees. Unlike ordinary bankruptcies, section 77 does not provide for liquidation;
rather, during the period of trusteeship virtually all debts and obligations of the rail-
road are held in abeyance. See J. DAUGHEN & P. BINZEN, THE WRECK OF THE PENN
CENTRAL 305-07 (1971) [hereinafter cited as DAUGHEN & BINZEN].
10. This group (known as the Robinson petitioners) consists of six former stock-
holders of the Pennsylvania Railroad or the New York Central Railroad who acquired
stock in the parent Penn Central Company formed as a result of the 1969 merger of
those lines. That they are not direct creditors of the bankrupt railroad raises some
question as to their standing in the reorganization proceeding. See Memorandum of
First National City Bank in Opposition to Robinson and Special Representatives Pe-
titions at 46-50, In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed Oct. 19, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as Memo of FNCBI.
11. This group of petitioners (known as the Special Representatives) represents
creditors whose claims were secured by specific railroad assets. Most of these assets
have so declined in value as to be practically worthless, and to this extent these holders
are in the position of general unsecured creditors. See Pre-Hearing Memorandum in
Support of Special Representatives' Petition at 2-3, In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., No.
70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed Oct. 5, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Memo of Special Represen-
tatives].
12. While the main thrust of petitioners' attack is based upon an alleged violation of
section 10, the Robinson petitioners, see note 10 supra, also allege fraud and misrepre-
sentation by the banks in their dealings with Penn Central and with the ICC. See
Petitioners' Pre-Trial Memorandum in Support of Petition for Declaration of Invalidity
of Credit Agreement Dated as of April 1, 1969, and Other Relief at 22-30, In re Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., No. 70-347 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 19, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Memo of Robinson Petitioners].
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in the negotiations between Penn Central and First National City Bank
a director of one of the lender banks was elected to the board of Penn
Central.'3 Penn Central issued $300,000,000 in promissory notes' 4 pur-
suant to the credit agreement and agreed to an immediate pledge of
100% of its stock in Pennsylvania Company (Pennco), a subsidiary,"5
upon the first takedown under the loan. 16 When Penn Central filed
for bankruptcy on June 21, 1970, the entire $300,000,000 had been taken
down by the railroad and no repayment of any portion had been made."
Both groups of petitioners contend that section 10 of the Clayton Act
was violated by the interlock between the lender bank and the railroad
and by the interlocks between the five participant banks and the rail-
13. A distinction has been drawn between "direct" and "indirect" dealing for purposes
of section 10, see Memo of FNCB, supra note 10, at 36. The election of a lending bank
director to the Penn Central board prior to the closing date of the credit agreement
created an interlock between direct dealers (a "direct" interlock), and arguably con-
stituted a violation of the Clayton Act, see Memo of Special Representatives, supra note
11, at 7-8; Memo of Robinson Petitioners, supra note 12, at 34-35. But see Memo of
FNCB 38.
Although the participant banks had existing direct interlocks with Penn Central, their
mere sharing in the loans advanced by the lending banks was thought to take those
"indirect" interlocks out of the prohibition of section 10, see Memo of FNCB 38.
Petitioners allege that the device of participation coupled with the characterization of
the interlocks as indirect was designed to circumvent the statute and did not reflect
the economic reality of the transaction, see Memo of Special Representatives 6; Memo
of Robinson Petitioners 30-33. The five participant lenders actually advanced $62,000,000;
adding the direct advance by Irving Trust (which, at the time of the closing of the
credit agreement, had a director in common with Penn Central), the total sum "tainted"
by interlocking directorates amounted to $77,000,000, see Memo of Special Representa-
tives 7-8.
14. Penn Central's application to the Interstate Commerce Commission for permission
to issue notes pursuant to section 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20a
(1970) (set out in part at note 23 infra), was granted. Penn Cent. Transp. Co.-Notes,
Finance Docket No. 25622 (May 16, 1969). Petitioners allege that the application was
fraudulent, thus vitiating the ICC approval. See note 33 infra.
15. After the merger of the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads in 1968,
the corporate structure of Penn Central was essentially three-tiered. The Penn Central
Company was a holding company whose major asset was the railroad, the Penn Central
Transportation Company. As the second tier, the railroad owned or controlled 186
subsidiary companies, including the Pennsylvania Company (Pennco), the third tier.
This investment company owned most of the nonrail assets and was worth an estimated
$980 million at the time of the pledge. The Pennco stock was the last unencumbered
asset of the railroad. See DAUGHEN & BINZ N, supra note 9, at 206-08, 230.
16. It appears that this agreement was considered interim financing while Penn Central
endeavored to effect a long-term blanket mortgage bond. Repayment of the $300,000,000
was to be refinanced out of the proceeds of the bond issue because Penn Central could
not repay that amount from its cash flow. See Memo of FNCB, supra note 10, at 27,
32.
17. Memo of FNCB, supra note 10, at 32.
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road because there was no competitive bidding during any stage of the
transactions.' 8 They seek to have the entire agreement nullified, thereby
disallowing the banks' claim against Penn Central. In the alternative,
petitioners request to have the banks' claims subordinated to the claims
of all other secured and unsecured creditors, with the elevation of the
stockholders to the status of general creditors.19 Because the Pennco
stock pledged as security for the credit agreement was the last unen-
cumbered asset of the railroad, the petitioners will be relegated to de-
ficiency claims unless they can take priority over the banks.
The dispute over the Penn Central credit agreement and stock pledge
raises a number of issues with regard to section 10 of the Clayton Act,
including: whether the transaction constituted a dealing in "securities,"
whether the participant banks Were "dealing" if the credit arrangement
did involve securities, and whether section 10 was intended to encom-
pass such indirect interlocks. Additionally, the Penn Central litigation
raises the issue of what remedies are available under the section; the
petitioners' request for nullification of the credit agreement is a novel
one. The far-reaching ramifications of this aspect of the reorganization
proceedings demand serious inquiry into the continuing viability of
section 10. This Note addresses each of these issues.
Definition of Securities
The initial difficulty in applying section 10 to a transaction is that
the term "securities" has not been defined either by that provision 2°
or by case law. A strong policy argument, however, can be advanced
that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its
purposes. Therefore, the scope and meaning of "security" 21 should be
determined by reference to substance, not form, and by focusing on the
economic realities of the transaction.
22
18. Memo of Robinson Petitioners, supra note 12, at 30; Memo of Special Representa-
tives, supra note 11, at 1.
19. Memo of Robinson Petitioners, supra note 12, at 2; Memo of Special Representa-
tives, supra note 11, at 1.
20. The'relevant text of section 10 is set out at note 5 supra.
21. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit gave only summary consideration to
this question in Klinger v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 432 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1970). The chal-
lenged transaction was the purchase, without competitive bidding, by one railroad of
its co-owner railroad's one-half interest in a produce terminal. The court simply noted
that "the notes and shares here certainly fit within any normal and reasonable meaning
of the word [securities]." Id. at 510.
22. This approach in the context of the Securities Exchange Acts was reflected in the
observation of the Supreme Court in Tcherepnin v. Knight. 389 U.S. 332 (1967), that
Vol. 17:737
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The use of "security" in section 10 is analogous to use of that term
in section 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act.23 This analogy is espe-
cially appropriate in view of the special policing function of the ICC
under section 1024 and the complementary relationship between that
provision and section 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act.25  Specifi-
cally, section 20a prohibits a carrier from issuing or assuming a security
without the approval of the ICC.26 The ICC has recognized that a loan
agreement may constitute a "security" within the meaning of section
20a even though the evidence of indebtedness is not negotiable.
Moreover, in Watt Transport, Inc.,28 involving loan agreements between
a bank and a transportation company, which were secured by guaran-
ties giving the bank a high degree of control over the carrier, the agency
in reaching its conclusions emphasized its right to look at the circum-
stances of the transaction, including the apparent intent of the parties.29
"[als used in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, security 'embodies a flexible rather than a
static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits.'" Id. at 338, quoting SEC v. Wj. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
23. 49 U.S.C. § 20a(2) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any carrier to issue any share of capital stock or
any bond or other evidence of interest in or indebtedness of the carrier
(hereinafter in this section collectively termed "securities") or to assume
any obligation or liability as lessor, lessee, guarantor, indorser, surety, or
otherwise, in respect of the securities of any other person, natural or
artificial. . . unless and until . . the commission by order authorizes such
issue or assumption.
The purpose of section 20a is to aid in the development of a national transportation
system by maintaining a sound economic foundation to support railroad credit and to
protect investors in railroad securities against incompetent and dishonest financing. See
Chicago S. Shore & S. Bend R.R. v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 106, 108 (N.D. Ind.
1963).
24. See note 5 supra.
25. See note 23 supra.
26. This relationship has been noted repeatedly by the Commission. See, e.g., Co-
lumbia Terminals Co.-Issuance of Notes, 40 I.C.C. (M.C.C.) 288, 293 (1945). See also
C. FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTIuES, TRAI;SPORTATION 54 (1961).
27. Transcontinental Bus System, Inc., Notes, 80 I.C.C. (M.C.C.) 54, 55-56 (1959).
Compare Interstate Investors Inc. v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 374, 387 (SD.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 393 U.S. 479 (1969) (per curiam) and Capital Transit Co.-Issuance of Securities,
40 I.C.C. (M.C.C.) 17, 20 (1944) with Ex Parte No. 275, Expanded Def. of Term
"Securities," 348 I.C.C. 288, 289 (1975).
28. 338 I.C.C. 338 (1971).
29. Id. at 343. In finding the loan agreements to be securities, the Commission did
not adopt the reasoning of the hearing examiner that determinative of what constituted
a security or evidence of indebtedness was the impact of the document in question
upon the capital structure of the carrier. Rather, it was influenced by Watt's prior
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This substance over form approach to credit transactions was adopted
formally by the ICC in Ex Parte No. 275, Expanded Definition of Term
"Securities". 30 The ICC broadened the term to include, without limi-
tation, advances, loan agreements, credit agreements, mortgages, chattel
mortgages, deeds of trust, equipment trusts, security agreements, and
purchases by means of some deferred payment scheme of property
having a useful life in excess of one year.3' This interpretation substan-
tially extended the definition of securities under which regulated car-
riers had been operating.32
The promissory notes issued by Penn Central pursuant to the credit
agreement are certainly securities under section 20a as construed pres-
endy.33 Given the negotiable character of those notes, the broad ap-
acquiescence in the characterization of the loan agreement by the Small Business
Administration as a note. Maintaining that its decision could be grounded on adequate
precedent, the ICC limited its holding to the specific facts of the case, acknowledging,
however, that in light of contemporary practices this problem might merit more
detailed analysis in a future rulemaking proceeding. This attention was accorded in
Ex Parte No. 275, Expanded Def. of Term "Securities," 348 I.C.C. 288 (1975), see notes
30-32 infra & accompanying text. Ex Parte No. 275, 348 I.C.C. 288 (1975).
30. 348 LC.C. 288 (1975).
31. Id. at 311. The Commission noted that it was not practical to attempt to list all
transactions that might come within the scope of "other evidence of interest in or in-
debtedness of the carrier," as those who sought to avoid the consequences of the
statute invariably would create different forms of transactions to avoid the regulated
forms. Rather, the enumeration of financial arrangements to be considered securities
was intended to serve as a guideline for the agency in carrying out congressional
intent. Id. at 307.
32. Cf. note 23 supra & accompanying text. Ex Parte No. 275 has had an interesting
history. The ICC instituted the proceeding in 1971, and in its order, 340 I.C.C. 817
(1972), confined the definition of securities to stocks, bonds, and promissory notes,
including loan agreements definite as to terms and purposes. Three months after the
entry of that order, the proceeding was reopened, resulting in a second order, 344
I.C.C. 114 (1973), expanding the definition of securities to insure flexibility to deal
with increasingly common methods of railroad financing. Strong adverse industry
reaction caused the ICC to stay the effective date of its second order. After recon-
sideration, the agency promulgated a third order, 348 I.C.C. 288 (1975), which was
essentially the same as the second. This order, however, recently was stayed pending
judicial review. 40 Fed. Reg. 51199 (1975).
33. Indeed, Penn Central applied to the ICC under section 20a for authority to issue
the promissory notes. See note 14 supra.
The petitioners contend that the ICC approval was invalid on the grounds that the
commitments to participate by banks having interlocking directors with the railroad
were not disclosed in the application to the agency, and that the agency was not
notified of the subsequent election of a director of one of the lender banks to Penn
Central's board prior to the closing of the credit agreement. Petitioners claim that
these facts made the application materially false and misleading. See Memo of Robinson
Petitioners, supra note 12, at 9, 21, 34, 50.
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proach taken toward the term "securities" by the ICC in applying
section 20a, and the complementary relationship existing between that
provision of the Interstate Commerce Act and section 10 of the Clayton
Act, they should be considered securities under section 10 as well. The
pledge of Pennco stock also should be classified as a security under
section 10, as illustrated by Klinger v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,a4 in
which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that notes and
shares of a railroad's noncarrier subsidiary were securities under that
section.
Definition of Dealing
Although section 1035 prohibits dealing in securities between a com-
mon carrier and its interlocks, the reach of this section is unclear, for
the term "dealing," as used in the provision, has not been defined statu-
torily or judicially. Administrative decisions in this area indicate that
dealing does include the issuance of preferred stock,-6 common stock, 7
and promissory notes38 by a railroad, as well as the purchase of mainte-
nance material by a railroad. 9 These decisions, however, involved direct
sales to or purchases from an interlocked corporation. The arrange-
ment between Penn Central and the participant banks constituted an
indirect transaction;, the participant banks acquired their interests from
the lender banks rather than as direct lenders. The question presented
is whether this transaction constituted a "dealing" between the railroad
and the interl6-ked participant banks, bringing it within the ambit of
section 10.40 O secondary concern is whether the dealings contem-
34. 432 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1970).
35. That section is set out in part at note 5 supra.
36. See, e.g., Securities of W. Pac. R.R, 145 I.C.C. 750, 751 (1928) (by implica-
tion).
37. See, e.g., Securities of Va. Cent. Ry., 154 I.C.C. 437, 440-41 (1929) (by implication).
38. See, e.g., Mississippi Export R.R.-Note, Finance Docket No. 20022 (April 22,
1958).
39. Cf., e.g., Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656,
668-69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); Beegle v. Thompson, 138 F.2d 875,
880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 743 (1943).
40. Cases arising under the Federal Bankruptcy Act have considered an analogous
question of whether a participant in a loan agreement is a creditor of the debtor cor-
poration. A bank having a simple participation interest in a debtor's note generally is
not a creditor. Compare In re Yale Express System, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) with In re Erie Forge & Steel Corp., 456 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1972).
The participation agreements ancillary to the Penn Central credit agreement expressly
left the participant banks "at risk" with the railroad: the lending banks were not acting
as guarantors. See Memo of Special Representatives, supra note 11, at 5. But the partici-
1976]
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plated by section 10 are limited to those involving the carrier's own
securities, 41 and if so, whether the participations offered by the lending
banks were really Penn Central securities.42  An examination of the
legislative history of section 10 helps to define the intended scope
ascribed by Congress to the phrase "dealings in securities, supplies, or
other articles of commerce."
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the railroad
system in the United States was intertwined not only with large bank-
ing interests but also with the industries that supplied railway mainte-
nance material. Frequently, the same men or corporations controlled all
three component organizations, resulting in the financial abuse of rail-
roads which were caught in the middle of "a web of entangling alli-
ances." 43 Louis D. Brandeis, a close advisor to President Wilson and
a strong opponent of what he termed the "Money Trust," published a
series of articles44 that decried the dangers of one man controlling
such vast systems. Brandeis urged that to break the Money Trust, the
system of interlocking directors must be prohibited: "Applied to cor-
porations which deal with each other, it [the practice of interlocking
pant banks could assert no rights against the debtor railroad in the event of its default.
See Memo of FNCB, supra note 10, at 37, 39(a).
41. This interpretation was implied by the Supreme Court in Minneapolis & St. L. Ry.
v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959):
[TIhe language of the several drafts of § 10, together with the types of
abuse cited in support of its enactment, suggests strongly that the words
"dealings in securities" were intended to cover only a carrier's dealings
with related persons in its own securities.
Id. at 190-91 n.13 (dictum) (emphasis supplied). Accord, Klinger v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 432 F.2d 506, 518 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring). This approach
does not square with the expansive concept of securities adopted by the ICC in applying
section 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act. See notes 30-31 supra & accompanying text.
42. Cf. Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir.
1969) (distinction drawn between participation interest and promissory note underlying
primary loan).
43. In re Financial Transactions of the N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R., 31 I.C.C. 32 (1914). The
commission found that this railroad system controlled over 300 subsidiary companies
largely through interlocking directorates, many of which were created and operated
to conceal transactions detrimental to the carrier. The report strongly condemned the
practice of one man serving on many boards of directors who, through bank deposits
and security sales, wielded control over large amounts of banking capital as well as
great railroad systems. Id. at 66.
Both the potential for abuse and the economic advantage available to the individuals
who control these structures are obvious, the latter making interlocking directorates
such a desirable business practice. Cf. Note, Interlocking Directorates: A Study in
Desultory Regulation, 29 IND. L.J. 429, 443 (1954).
44. L. BRAwNDEs, OTHER PEopiax's MorNY (Harper Torchbook ed. 1967) (originally
published as Breaking the Money Trusts, HAm, Ex's, Nov. 22, 1913 to Jan. 17, 1914).
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directorates] tends to disloyalty and to violate the fundamental law
that no man can serve two masters." 45 Such arguments prompted Presi-
dent Wilson to -ask Congress for legislation protecting the railroads
from further financial abuse by other industries through interlocking
directorates.46
The House version of section 10 contemplated an absolute prohibi-
tion of interlocks between railroads and banks dealing in the securities
of the railroad.47 The Senate, however, substantially altered this version
and proposed the requirement of competitive bidding and supervision
by the ICC in lieu of a complete proscription of interlocking directors. 8
Senator Chilton, a proponent of the Senate version, explained the pur-
pose and contemplated effect of the provision:
[I]nstead of undertaking to regulate the matter of interlocking di-
rectors through the personnel of the board, it [the Senate bill]
dealt directly with the evil, which was the objectionable transac-
tion .... If a common carrier has bonds to sell, it can not sell them
to a bank which has as its director or manager or purchasing officer
anyone who at the same time occupies a trust capacity or is in-
terested in another corporation with which the dealings may be
had, unless the transaction is open and fair, and the common carrier,
after competition, gets the best prices for the bonds....49
The allowance of dealings between carriers and interlocked corpora-
tions conditioned upon competitive bidding was incorporated into the
final enactment.
Thus, although the Clayton Act was intended to supplement the
Sherman Act in an effort to arrest monopolies and trusts in their in-
cipiency,59 not all transactions between interlocked carriers and cor-
porations are forbidden. Rather, section 10 seeks to protect carriers
by requiring arm's length dealing to preclude overreaching. But nothing
45. Id. at 35.
46. 51 CONG. REc. 1978-79 (1914). The President's address stressed the need to correct
the harm done to railroads caused by their financial structure:
It [business] waits for acquiescence ... for laws which will effectually
prohibit and prevent such interlockings of the personnel of the directorates
of great corporations . . . as in effect result in making those who borrow
and those who lend practically one and the same ....
Id. at 1978.
47. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
48. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1914).
49. 51 CoNG. Rac. 16002-03 (1914). This example prophetically foreshadowed the
transaction between the Penn Central and the banks.
50. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong, 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
1976]
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in the statutory language or the legislative history of that provision
suggests that it is to be limited to transactions between direct inter-
locks. The Senate's emphasis on the "objectionable transaction" itself
as the evil to be eradicated illustrates the need to dissect the form of
the transaction to lay bare its purpose and effect. The potential for
financial abuse of the railroad is present in both direct and indirect in-
terlocking relationships,51 suggesting that the focus in determining
whether section 10 is applicable should be on the substantive impact of
the transaction rather than on its form.
Penn Central negotiated solely with First National City Bank, a non-
interlocked corporation. 2 The magnitude of the loan, however, neces-
sitated the participation of other banks in the transaction. 3 The inter-
locking participant banks were committed to their shares of the lender
bank advances before the credit agreement was closed. The partici-
pants were equally "at risk" with the lenders,54 and although most of
the substantive terms of the agreement were negotiated through FNCB
as agent, the railroad did negotiate directly the amounts it would deposit
in accounts with the participant banks as compensating balances. 5 In-
sofar as the participant banks were involved in the negotiations concern-
ing the credit agreement prior to closing, then, they appear to stand
on equal footing with the lender banks in having dealt in securities of
the carrier.56 The indirect nature of the participants' role in the credit
51. This view is supported by a report of the Staff of the House Committee on the
Judiciary: "Competitive bidding is Section 10's only recognized safeguard against vertical
interlocks otherwise prohibited. Removal of this safeguard, of course, provides oppor-
tunity for abuse." STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
REPORT ON INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 31 (Comm. Print 1965).
In the first case brought under section 10, In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 13 F. Supp. 888
(E.D. Mo. 1935), the court found that section 10 clearly applied to a railroad purchase
of stock of an interlocked real estate corporation. Responding to the argument that
such a sale was not amenable to competitive bidding, the court stated: "[If . . . no
competitive bids are possible, then the statute forbids the deal absolutely." Id. at 893.
52. The railroad had engaged in substantial prior dealings with First National with re-
gard to its own financing and financing for its subsidiaries. See DAUGHEN & BINZEN, supra
note 9, at 192, 256 n.2, 206. When Penn Central went bankrupt its indebtedness to First
National alone exceeded $300,000,000. Id. at 259.
53. During the period of negotiations over the credit agreement, FNCB was within
$35,000,000 of its legal lending limit. By the terms of the agreement, however, it was
committed to advance $92,000,000. The difference had to be covered by participation
agreements with other banks. See Memo of Special Representatives, supra note 11, at
5-6.
54. See note 36 sipra.
55. See Memo of Robinson Petitioners, supra note 12, at 36.
56. The practice of a carrier issuing commercial paper through an agent who then
places the paper with otherwise disqualified institutions was criticized recently as clearly
[Vol. 17:737
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transaction could not preclude the potential for abuse inherent in an
interlocking relationship when those banks, having made commitments
to share in the advances under the final agreement, were apprised of
the underlying negotiations. 7 Negotiations leading to a final operating
agreement are merely one step in its consummation; in essence, there is
only one transaction."
frustrating the purpose of section 10. STAFF STUDY FOR THE SPECIAL COMM. ON INvEST-
GATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 92D CONG, 1ST
SESS., INADEQUACIES OF PROTECTION FOR INVESTORS IN PENN CENTRAL AND OTHER ICC-
REGULATED COMPANIES 7 (Subcomm. Print 1971).
Further, the prohibitory language of section 10 is directed toward the carrier's own
action. Thus, it is immaterial whether after consummation of the credit agreement the
interlocking participant banks, through FNCB, merely were "holding" Penn Central
securites or actually were "dealing" in them, as the violation consisted of the railroad's
prior negotiations with the participants over compensating balances. But cf. Interstate
Investors, Inc. v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
57. If the participant banks acquire participation in the loan in a secondary transac-
tion after the terms of the loan are finalized, however, the potential for abuse is no
longer present. The participant banks should be held to have.had no dealings with the
carrier.
58. In Chicago & Nw. Ry.-Proposed Competitive Bidding Exemption, 328 I.C.C. 625
(1966), the railroad applied for authority to issue a new series of first mortgage bonds
to holders of its series B bonds and proposed to negotiate privately with these bond-
holders. Because several of the investment companies holding series B bonds had inter-
locks with the railroad, the railroad requested an exemption from the competitive
bidding requirement of section 10. In denying the railroad's application, the Commission
stated:
It is clear that, without exemption from competitive bidding, applicant may
not discuss or negotiate the terms of the proposed sale of bonds with the
present holders of its bonds. The terms which would be under discussion
are an integral part of the terms of sale of the proposed bonds. . . .Ne-
gotiations with respect to such financial transaction[s] are but the first step
in a chain of events leading to the actual issuance of the security itself,
and exemption should not be granted when the actual sale of the bonds...
must be through competitive bidding.
Id. at 628-29.
Petitioners also assert that the election of a director of one of the lender banks to the
board of the Penn Central three days prior to the signing of the final agreement vio-
lated section 10. See note 13 supra. At this time, however, all negotiations regarding
these agreements were completed. By its terms, section 10 prohibits a dealing in securi-
ties when "the ... common carrier shall have upon its board of directors... any person
who is at the sane time a director.., of... such other corporation ..." 15 U.S.C.
5 20 (1970) (emphasis supplied). Inasmuch as the negotiations were completed by the
time the bank's director was elected to the Penn Central's board, this director was not
serving during the dealing. Section 10 creates no liability unless an interlocking rela-
tionship exists at the time of the alleged violation. See Beegle v. Thompson, 138 F.2d
875, 880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 743 (1943).
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Section 10 Comprebends Indirect Interlocks
The legislative history of section 10 9 clearly indicates a national
policy to protect the public from the results of fraud and overreaching
in the financing of railroads. This policy should justify extending the
scope of the statute to all situations in which an interlocked corporation
participates in the sale or distribution of carrier securities in what is
essentially one transaction.60
Such an expansive reading does not conflict with the operative inter-
pretation of section 10 as a "narrow prohibition applicable to activity
that is conceptually within the antitrust philosophy." 61 Among the
evils sought to be curtailed by section 10 are sales of securities or sup-
plies to or by common carriers for excessive62 or inadequate 3 considera-
tion, respectively, at the insistence of interlocking directorates. The
primary purpose of the statute is to ensure that carriers are financially
able to provide the public with efficient, economical transportation.
That interest can be affected as much by indirect dealings as by direct
dealing with interlocks if the decisions to buy and sell or to borrow
and lend in reality are made by common directors. A construction of
section 10 that excludes "indirect" interlocks from its operation clearly
59. See notes 43-51 supra.
60. For example, in Pennsylvania 0. & D.R.R. Bonds, 254 I.C.C. 473 (1943), the rail-
road applied for authority to issue first and refunding mortgage bonds guaranteed by
the Pennsylvania Railroad, P.O. & D.'s lessee. The bonds were sold, subject to ICC
approval, to an investment house with which the railroad had been negotiating. No
other investors were consulted. A Pennsylvania stockholder intervened, alleging that
the purchase of the bonds from the investing house by financial institutions having
interlocks with the guarantor railroad would violate the spirit and intent, if not the
letter, of section 10. The Commission declined to decide this question. Commissioner
Mahaffie dissented, stating:
Considering the broad public interest, I do not regard as a healthy condi-
tion in railroad financing a situation where, in the sale of securities by
private negotiation, the same person, although he takes no part in the
particular transaction, is serving as an officer or director of the carrier
issuing or guaranteeing the securities and as an officer or director of a
company participating in the sale and distribution of those securities. This
is true whether such officer or director doubles as underwriter, 'sub-
underwriter, member of the selling group, or innediate purchaser from
any of these instrizmentalities since all are engaged in what is essentially one
transaction.
Id. at 484 (emphasis supplied).
61. United States v. Boston & Me. R.R., 380 U.S. 157, 162 (1965); accord, Klinger v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 432 F.2d 506, 516 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring).
62. See Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173, 190 (1959).
63. See Klinger v. Baltimore & O.R.R, 432 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1970).
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frustrates the purpose of the statute. Although section 10 may be drawn
narrowly, a restrictive interpretation of the section affronting the
purpose for which it was enacted, protection of carrier assets, is un-
warranted."
Thus, transactions between carriers and indirect interlocks should be
analyzed carefully" for evidence of dealing in securities or supplies
between them. The mere presence of a third party intermediary should
not give rise to a per se determination that a railroad has not dealt with
an interlocked corporation; section 10 does not make the intervention
of a third party an alternative to compliance with the competitive bid-
ding requirement. 6 If, then, prior to the closing of a loan agreement
between an agent bank and a carrier, an interlocking bank should play
any role in the underlying negotiations, discuss with the carrier pro-
posals ancillary to the agreement, or commit itself to participation in
advancing funds under the agreement, the lender-participant arrange-
ment becomes merely an avoidance scheme that should not shield a
substantive violation of section 10.
64. Cleary v. Chalk, 488 F.2d 1315, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938
(1974).
65. One commentator has suggested that the very existence of an interlock is indica-.
rive of the fact that the corporations intend to deal with each other to a greater extent
than they would if no interlock existed. Travers, Interlocks in Corporate Management
and the Antitrust Laws, 46 TL'xAs L. REv. 819, 851 (1968). Dealings between interlocks
therefore should be subjected to careful scrutiny to prevent transactions that are unfairly
advantageous to the greater corporation without adequate benefit to the smaller.
As a result of Penn Central's bankruptcy, the ICC's regulation of carrier financing was
criticized strongly for failure to investigate sufficiently. STAFF STUDY FOR TrM SPECIAL
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FoREIGN COMMERCE, 92D
CONG., IST SESS., INADEQUACIES OF PROTECTIONS FOR INVEsTORS IN PENN CENTRAL AND
OTHMR ICC-REGuLAaED COMPANIES (Subcomm. Print 1971).
66. Once the need for competitive bidding is established, the issue is whether the
interlock itself must bid or whether this requirement is satisfied if an intermediate party
does the bidding and then sells participation to interlocks. For a discussion of this
collateral issue in the context of financing through equipment trust certificates and con-
ditional sales agreements, see Comment, Railroad Equipment Financing: Clayton § 10 and
Dealings Between Interlocks, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 370 (1972).
One court has stated that section 10 imposes a duty upon the interlock not to deal
with the carrier except through competitive bidding. Klinger v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
432 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1970). It would appear consistent with the purpose of section
10, however, for an independefit investment banking company to bid for the carrier's
securities and, through a bona fide secondary transaction, tb sell these securities to inter-
locks. The carrier is protected by competitive bidding, and the possibility of detrimental
influence on the carrier by the interlock is minimized by the intervening secondary
transaction.
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Inrnninity from Antitrust Laws
Assuming that the Penn Central credit agreement did constitute a
violation of section 10 of the Clayton Act, ICC approval of the issuance
of promissory notes by the railroad",7 may have exempted that action
from the antitrust laws by reason of section 5(11) of the Interstate
Commerce Act."8 Section 5 (11) provides that commission approval of
a transaction directed toward carrier consolidation supersedes the opera-
don of the antitrust laws, including, by judicial construction,"a section
10 of the Clayton Act. Thus, in Denver & Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Co. v. United States,7° the Supreme Court indicated that an issuance
of securities in accordance with section 20a of the Interstate Commerce
Act might be protected from antitrust sanctions if the promulgation
were in furtherance of a consolidation approved by the ICC under
section 5.71 The court emphasized, however, that section 5 immunity
must be the result of a careful administrative consideration of the anti-
competitive effects of the transaction.7 2
The ICC adopted the Supreme Court's reading of sections 5 and 20a
to protect an issuance of promissory notes from attack on section 10
grounds in Railway Express Agency, Inc., Notes.7" It has not, however,
extended the section 5 umbrella to transactions not involving some
aspect of carrier consolidation. Thus, in a 1966 case in which carrier
consolidation was not involved, the Commission held that it had no
power to suspend the requirement of competitive bidding when it
67. See note 14 supra.
68. 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1970). That provision states:
The authority conferred by this section shall be exclusive and plenary
and any carriers or other corporations . . . participating in a transaction
approved or authorized under the provisions of this section shall be and
are relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws ....
69. See Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1959); cf.
Quirke v. Chessie Corp., 368 F. Supp. 558, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
70. 387 U.S. 485 (1967).
71. The Court emphasized that section 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act, under
which the Commission had acted, by its terms did not create an exemption as did
section 5. Public benefits derived from an integrated national transportation system
were more likely to result from the consolidations of carriers at which section 5 was
directed than from the mere issuance of stock by carriers. When the issuance of stock
was pursuant to a consolidation plan, however, the Commission could exempt the
transaction under section 5 after weighing the anticompetitive impact against the public
interest. Id. at 496-97.
72. 387 U.S. at 498; McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87 (1944).
73. 348 I.C.C. 157, 211-12 (1975).
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otherwise would be applicable, as the statute itself made no provision
for exemption.7 4
Although the ICC therefore does have the power to immunize a
transaction otherwise prohibited by section 10, it can do so only after
balancing the anticompetitive impact against the public benefit, and
only if the dealing is an integral part of a carrier consolidation."8 In
the section 20a proceeding approving the issuance of the Penn Central
notes, the ICC could not have considered adequately the anticompetitive
impact as it was not aware that interlocked participant banks were in-
volved in the transaction. 6 Furthermore, the notes were not issued as
part of a consolidation, merger, or unification agreement such as is
contemplated by section 5.77 Thus, ICC approval of the railroad's
promissory notes should not legitimize the credit agreement and pledge
of Pennco stock if they otherwise violate section 10.
Remedies
The shareholders and the special representatives seek to have the
credit and pledge agreements declared invalid as violative of the
Clayton Act and to have the banks' claims for repayment of the $300,-
000,000 disallowed or subordinated. Section 10 itself provides for
criminal sanctions against the carrier and any directors of the carrier
who knowingly voted for or directed the objectionable transaction. 8
Civil liability also attaches through section 4 of the Clayton Act,"
74. Chicago & Nw. Ry.-Proposed Competitive Bidding Exemption, 328 I.C.C. 625, 630
(1966); cf. note 71 tupra.
75. For a general discussion of the power of regulatory agencies to immunize against
operation of the antitrust laws, see Schwarzer, Regulated Industries and the Antitrust
Laws-An Overview, 41 ICC PRAc. J. 543 (1974).
76. See Memo of Special Representatives, supra note 11, at 7.
77. Cf. note 71 supra & accompanying text.
78. The pertinent portion of that statute reads:
If any common carrier shall violate this section, it shall be fined not
exceeding S25,000; and every such director, agent, manager, or officer
thereof who shall have knowingly voted for or directed the act constituting
such violation ...shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
fined not exceeding $5,000 or confined in jail not exceeding one year, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 20 (1970).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), provides that:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy,
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which allows treble damages to any person injured "by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws." 80 Thus, section 10 by its terms
does not provide for cancellation of the agreement as a remedy, and
there are no cases reaching this result.
An analogy can be made, however, to the defense of illegality to a
contract action under the Sherman Act. This approach has not been
favored,"' but the cases do indicate that it is properly applicable when
public policy considerations demand that the contract not be enforced. 2
The Supreme Court has stated that it will entertain the defense only
when the contract sued upon is intrinsically illegal and is in direct con-
travention of an express statutory prohibitionY' Although in the in-
stant case the question of illegality is raised as the basis for an affirma-
tive claim rather than as a defense, analogy to cases under the Sherman
Act is still appropriate. If the Penn Central credit agreement was in
violation of section 10 and the court declines to invalidate it, the result
will be judicial allowance of the enforcement of an illegal contract.
The mere fact that section 10 is silent on this point should not require
such a result. 4 Moreover, this proceeding arises under section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act,8 5 which gives the court broad equitable power to
effect a rehabilitation of the railroad's financial structure.8 6 Therefore,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
80. Section 10 has been recognized to be an antitrust provision for purposes of section
4; see United States v. Boston & Me. R.R., 380 U.S. 157, 160 (1965) quoting Minneapolis
& St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173, 190 (1959).
81. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 518 (1959). One reason for the court's un-
favorable response to the defense is that it often is raised by a defendant who has
participated knowingly in the illegal transaction, and then asserts the illegality to avoid
paying for goods or services already received. As noted by the Court in Kelly, to allow
the defense in these cases as a collateral means of enforcing the antitrust laws would
create "a very strange class of private attorneys general." Id. at 520.
82. See, e.g., Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227,
262 (1909)-; cf. McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 669 (1899).
83. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755 (1947). The defense
in this case was that the contract violated the Robinson-Patman Act; the Court reached
its conclusions, however, by analogizing to the defense of illegality under the Sherman
Act.
84. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S.
743 (1947), noted that: "'Where a contract is outlawed by statute or is otherwise contrary
to public policy, the illegality may be set up as a defense to a suit for enforcement
despite the absence of a legislative recognition of that defense." Id. at 761. Cf. D.R.
Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1915).
85. 11 U.S.C. S 205 (1970). See note 9 supra.
86. 'The purpose of a § 77 reorganization is to produce a viable corporate enterprise
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the court has the power to void the credit and pledge agreements as
unlawful8 7 under section 10 of the Clayton Act.
The banks argue that the railroad suffered no damage as a result of
the $300,000,000 loan transaction, and that consequently, petitioners are
not entitled to a remedy even if there was a technical violation of sec-
tion 10. Several courts, faced with section 10 violations, have reached
this result.8 9 These courts apparently have adopted a fair value test
to determine damages, concluding that if the carrier received or paid
fair market value in the transaction there was no damage, despite the
absence of competitive bidding.90 These cases, however, involved
plaintiffs seeking recovery under section 4 of the Clayton Act,9' which
allows "any person who shall be injured" to "recover threefold the
dazages by him sustained." 9 2 Thus, these decisions are not controlling on
a suit brought under section 10 that seeks to invalidate an allegedly
unlawful transaction as part of a reorganization proceeding.9 3
Moreover, the legislative history of section 1013 indicates that the
congressional purpose was deterrence, not compensation. In this respect,
section 10 resembles a conflict of interest statute such as that involved
in United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.,95 in which the
Supreme Court noted the legislative intent to adopt an objective stand-
ard of conduct since actual corruption or loss were not made elements
of a statutory offense. Any deviation from that standard is a per se
violation subjecting the offender to the imposition of penalties."6 Both
capable of supplying adequate transportation services to the public . . . ." In re Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 358 F. Supp. 154, 180 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
87. Cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). But cf. In re Bichel Optical Labs., Inc.,
299 F. Supp. 545 (D. Minn. 1969) (antitrust claim not available to debtor as defense
to claims in involuntary bankruptcy proceeding); accord, In re Otto's Liquor, Inc., 321
F. Supp. 160 (D. Minn. 1970).
88. Memo of FNCB, supra note 10, at 41-42.
89. See, e.g., Bangor Punta Ops,, Inc. v. Bangor & A.R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 715-16 & n.12
(1974); Cleary v. Chalk, 488 F.2d 1315, 1323 & n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 938 (1974); Klinger v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 432 F.2d 506, 512-16 (2d Cir. 1970);
Schleiff v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 43 F.R.D. 175, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
90. The ICC also has taken this approach in authorizing the issuance of securities
under section 20a despite a potential violation of section 10, because the negotiated
price was fair and reasonable. Pennsylvania, 0. & D.R.R. Bonds, 254 I.C.C. 473, 478
(1943) (by implication).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), set obt at note 79 supra.
92. Id. (emphasis supplied).
93. See Bangor Punta Ops., Inc. v. Bangor & A.R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 725-32 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. &se notes 43-51 supra & accompanying text.
95. 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
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section 10 and conflict of interest statutes are premised on the theory
that no man can serve two masters, and the language -of section 10 does
not specify actual damage as a requisite for imposition of the criminal
penalties. Therefore, mere violation of section 10 should engender
some remedy.
Finally, it is doubtful that the relatively minor criminal penalties
provided in the statute97 serve as an effective deterrent. The strong
public policy underlying section 10 can be vindicated only through a
private suit seeking either damages or nullification of the unlawful
transaction. To preclude such action on the equitable basis that there
has been no damage would frustrate the purpose of that section. As
previously noted, the goal of section 10, and other statutes dealing with
common carriers, is to encourage the development of an efficient and
responsive system of national transportation. The banks argue that
they contributed to this goal by providing Penn Central with "the
largest single railroad financing ever implemented in the United States"
at a time when its operating position was deteriorating and the avail-
96. Id. at 548-51. In United States v. Boston & Me. R.R., 380 U.S. 157 (1965), the
Court determined that section 10 was "not strictly a conflict of interest statute" such
as that involved in Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 380 U.S. at 160. The question before
the Court, however, was whether particular conduct came within the statutory pro-
hibition, not whether penalties for a clear violation could be foreclosed by an absence
of demonstrable injury. Application of this rule of strict construction of criminal laws.
undeniably proper for purposes of determining the scope of permissible conduct, is
not compelled when imposition of sanctions is at issue.
97. The carrier can be fined a maximum of S25,000, and any director who knowingly
voted for the unlawful act is subject to an additional fine of $5,000 plus one year in jail.
See note 78 supra.
No case has extended the criminal sanctions of section 10 beyond the clear language
of the statute; however, civil liability in the form of treble damages has been held
applicable to the interlock on the theory that such liability, to be effective, must reach
both parties to the transaction. See Klinger v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 432 F.2d 506, 512
(2d Cir. 1970).
98. See Bangor Punta Ops., Inc. v. Bangor & A.R.R., 417 U.S. 703, 725-32 (1974)
(Marshall, Douglas, Brennan, & White, JJ., dissenting). This action was brought by the
railroad against its former owners for alleged antitrust violations occurring during the
period of their control. Reasoning that the real party in interest was the investment
corporation that had purchased the carrier for a fair price, the majority denied the
claim on the grounds that the corporation had no standing to complain of prior abuses,
and that if recovery on behalf of the railroad was allowed, the benefit would go to its
owner, constituting unjust enrichment. Id. at 710-13.
Neither of these objections are applicable to the Penn Central facts as petitioners are
creditors and stockholders who held their interests at the time of the transaction, see
Memo of Special Representatives, supra note 11, at 2-3; Memo of FNCB, supra note 10,
at 2, and if the relief sought is granted, no windfall will result.
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ability of credit from any other source was doubtful. 9 Although the
banks did not use their interlocking directorates to the detriment of
the railroad, their credit extensions did not redound to the benefit of
the public. Most of these funds were diverted into unprofitable outside
enterprises: little was spent to maintain or upgrade railroad equipment
and service.'0 There is no evidence that the banks had knowledge, in
1969, of the full magnitude of Penn Central's financial difficulties;101
it is at least arguable, however, that absent the interlocking relation-
ships 02 the banks would have made a more thorough inquiry before
agreeing to give the railroad further credit. And as noted by the Special
Representative, the banks should have known that other Penn Central
creditors were secured by worthless assets, and would have to look to
the Pennco stock, the carrier's last unencumbered asset, for their se-
curity. 0 3 Thus the existence of interlocking directorates benveen Penn
Central and the banking community helped to create the exact situation
that Congress intended to avoid by section 10.
CONCLUSION
The collapse of the Penn Central Railroad has fostered much concern
regarding the practicability of retaining private control of the major rail
systems. Some congressional inquiry has focused specifically on the
role played by the interlocking directorates and their effect on the
railroad's demise.104 The magnitude of the collapse, however, demands
that Congress give this problem serious attention.
That the financial abuse of railroads through manipulation by inter-
locks is of continuing concern today is illustrated by the Penn Central
litigation; the public has been deprived of an efficient rail system pre-
99. Memo of FNCB, supra note 10, at 42.
100. See DAUCHEN & BiNzEN, supra note 9, at 137-41.
101. See id. at 230-31.
102. During the pertinent period of 1969 two-thirds of Penn Central Transportation's
Board of Directors had interlocking bank relationships. This built-in conflict of interest,
according to the Robinson petitioners, resulted in a "banking attitude" instead of a
"railroading attitude" in the decisions made by Penn Central. Memo of Robinson
Petitioners, supra note 12, at 4-5.
103. Memo of Special Representatives, supra note 11, at 2.
104. STAFF REPORT OF THE SEC TO THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 92D CONG., 2D SeSs., THE FINANCIAL
COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY (Subcomm. Print 1972); STAFF STUDY FOR THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF TE HOUSE CoMm. ON LNTERSTATE & FOREIGN
COMMERCE, 91T CONG., IST SESS., INADEQUACIES OF PROTECTIONS FOR INVESTORS IN PENN
CENTRAL AND OTHER ICC-REGULATED COMPANIES (Subcomrn. Print 1971).
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dominantly because of the diversion of large amounts of capital from
the maintenance of the system.1 5 The inquiry must not end with a
mere affirmation of the viability of section 10, however. The scope and
implementation of the section need clarification. It appears that the
practice of a carrier issuing commercial paper through an agent who
then places the paper with otherwise disqualified institutions is used
frequently to circumvent the prohibitions of section 10. ° Affirmative
legislative action is needed to eradicate this practice when implemented
in other than a bona fide secondary transaction. The absence of com-
petitive bidding should constitute a per se violation of the section suffi-
cient to give rise to at least the imposition of the criminal penalties of
that section.10 7 With respect to such penalties, the legislature should
act affirmatively to clarify its intent; it does not appear that the Depart-
ment of Justice ever has brought a criminal action against a railroad's
directors under section 10.
Appropriate civil remedies for a section 10 violation must be ascer-
tained. First, any penalty, to serve as an effective deterrent, should
reach the interlock as well as the railroad. Judicial sanction of a section
10 violation in which the court determines that the railroad suffered
no damage because it received fair market value in the transaction
should be disfavored. This approach fails to indicate the strong public
interest inherent in the operation of public transportation systems.
Likewise, the ICC should not be authorized to approve such a trans-
action on the basis of a fair market value test. Although the relief sought
by petitioners is novel, nullification of the agreement should be allowed
to prevent judicial sanction of an illegal contract and to fulfill the de-
terrent purpose of the section.
Thus, the bankruptcy of the Penn Central demands congressional re-
examination of section 10, closer supervision of the ICC, and responsible
judicial effectuation of the provisions of that section. Serious enforce-
ment of section 10 is necessary to prevent manipulation of railroads for
the profit of those who control them, at the expense of the public.
105. See notes 100-102 supra & accompanying text.
106. See STAFF STUDY FOR THE SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 92D CONG., IST SESS., INADEQUACIES OF PROTECTION
FOR INvESTORS IN PENN CENT'RTAL & OTHER ICC-REGULATED COMPANIES 7 (Subcomm.
Print 1971).
107. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1sT SESS., REPORT ON
INTFRLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 31 (Comm. Print. 1965).
